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Reply to a comment on ”Quantum theory and
the limits of objectivity”
Richard Healey∗
Abstract
In this short note I reply to criticisms of an argument in my paper [1]
that appear in comment [2]. I refer the reader to section 4 of [1] in which
I described the scenario of a Gedankenexperiment on which is based the
argument criticized in [2]. The authors of [2] raise one “main criticism”
then go on to claim that the argument of [1] contains a series of problems.
But their “main criticism” is not an objection to the argument and the
problems are of their own making. In replying to what they call their
main criticism I will take this opportunity to exhibit the structure of the
argument and so make clear why this is not an objection to that argument.
In this short note I reply to criticisms of an argument in my paper [1] that
appear in comment [2]. I refer the reader to section 4 of [1] in which I described
the scenario of a Gedankenexperiment on which is based the argument criticized
in [2]. The authors of [2] raise one “main criticism” then go on to claim that
the argument of [1] contains a series of problems. But their “main criticism” is
not an objection to the argument and the problems are of their own making.
In replying to what they call their main criticism I will take this opportunity
to exhibit the structure of the argument and so make clear why this is not an
objection to that argument.
I begin by addressing the “main criticism” offered in [2], there stated as
follows:
“. . . the computed correlation functions entering the Bell’s inequality are in
principle experimentally inaccessible, and hence the author’s claim is in principle
not testable”.
There is a simple reply. To regard this as a criticism of the argument in
section 4 of [1] is to misunderstand the structure of that argument. That the
probabilistic correlations predicted by quantum theory in the scenario of the
Gedankenexperiment there described are not (in a certain sense) testable is a
feature of the argument, not a bug! That argument proceeds by reductio ad
absurdum. It proves that a number of plausible premises are in fact mutually
inconsistent. If the proof is valid then at least one of these premises must be
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false. The point of the argument is to explore the consequences for objectivity of
the assumption that the probabilistic predictions of unitary quantum theory are
correct, including when the theory is applied to an entire isolated experimental
laboratory containing an experimenter performing a quantum measurement and
recording its outcome. Whether these predictions can be tested in the scenario
of the Gedankenexperiment is simply irrelevant to the validity of the argument.
Here is the sense in which the probabilistic correlation functions predicted by
quantum theory in the scenario of the Gedankenexperiment described in section
4 of [1] are untestable. Frequency data of the outcomes of every repetition of the
sequence of single quantum measurements by Alice, Bob, Carol and Dan could
not all be tabulated together in a single, localized space-time region within the
world-tube of a single spatially-localized experimenter. So no localized agent
(not just Alice, Bob, Carol or Dan) could compare the statistical correlation
functions computed from these data with the probabilistic correlation functions
predicted by quantum theory to see how well they match. I take it that this is
what is meant by the first sentence of the passage from [2] describing the “first
problem” with the argument of [1]:
“The violation of the proposed Bell’s inequality cannot, not even in principle,
be tested, because in no region of space-time are the experimental data from
which all the correlations functions can be extracted available.”
Of course, the assumption (A) implies that all this experimental data is
present somewhere in the much larger space-time region in which are located all
the quantum measurements performed throughout the duration of theGedanken-
experiment.
(A) Every quantum measurement has a definite (unique, objective) phys-
ical outcome.
But, though (by assumption) present there, all this data is not epistemically
accessible to any individual experimenter. Any attempt by an experimenter
to access all this data would involve physical interactions that would break
the isolation of the experimenters’ labs involved in the Gedankenexperiment
and disrupt the delicate sequence of operations they perform in each repetition
wiithin the Gedankenexperiment.
That the violation of the proposed Bell’s inequality cannot, not even in
principle, be tested raises no problem for the argument of [1].
The authors of [2] attempt to raise a second problem that would be faced
by anyone wishing to remove the alleged first problem by “attributing an oper-
ational meaning to the computed expressions for the [probabilistic] correlation
functions”. But this is no problem, since, having dismissed the first “problem”,
anyone giving the argument of [1] has no need to “attribute an operational
meaning to the computed correlation functions” and should not wish to do so.
As the authors of [2] correctly note, if Alice and Bob were to try to test
their predictions and actually violate a Bell’s inequality with data they had
collected, they would have to adapt the experimental protocol in some way
(which then may or may not in fact predict such violation). But the validity of
the argument of [1] neither requires nor motivates any change in the protocol
there described. As it stands, that argument does not require “the standard
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assumptions for testing the violation of Bell’s inequalities namely ‘freedom of
choice’ and ‘locality’”.
In a section entitled “Analysis of the protocol” the authors of [2] discuss what
they call “fundamental problems with the proposal in [1]”. After repeating the
(true, but irrelevant) claim of untestability, they diagnose “multiple problems”
stemming from the assumption that the measurement of Carol and Dan are
considered as unitary transformations. Now it is a basic assumption of the
entire reductio argument that every interaction may be viewed as proceeding in
accordance with a unitary transformation in the relevant total quantum state.
The argument shows that this assumption leads to conflict with assumption
(A)–that was the point of the argument, not a problem with it.
The first of the “multiple problems” concerns an ambiguity that allegedly
arises from the fact that certain probabilistic correlation functions are computed
from two different reference frames. The authors of [2] note that that there
would be no ambiguity if these correlation functions would refer to measurement
data, since these are reference frame independent. But the correlation functions
do refer to measurement data: in the correlation E(a, d) they refer to data
collected in measurements by Alice and by Dan, while in the correlation E(b, c)
they refer to data collected in measurements by Bob and by Carol. In a single
repetition within the Gedankenexperiment these data are collected in the regions
of Figure 1 of [1] there labeled U1
A
, U2
D
, U2
B
, U1
C
respectively. Assumption (A)
guarantees the objectivity of this data, even while each of their measurement
interactions is assumed to correspond to the unitary transformation used to
label these regions of the figure.
The second of these “problems” alleges another kind of ambiguity, of a kind
first alleged in [3]. Alternative ways of calculating E(a, d) and E(b, c) are pro-
posed, in each case leading to an alternative value for this quantity: specifi-
cally, evaluated in Alice’s reference frame E(b, c) = 0 for all times rather than
−cos(b − c) as claimed in [1]. But this evaluation in Alice’s frame is incorrect,
since it assumes that it is possible to assign a value to the outcome of a measure-
ment by Bob (Carol) even though Bob’s (Carol’s) register is in, or returned to,
its fixed pre-measurement state. The only correlations considered in the argu-
ment of [1] are correlations between the measurement outcomes whose objective
occurrence follows from assumption (A). Each of these outcomes occurs in the
localized space-time region where the relevant measurement is performed. No
outcome occurs in a region where a register is in its pre-measurement state: and
a measurement by Carol (Dan) occurs when and where she (he) makes it, not in
a space-time region where Alice or Bob might have performed a measurement
on Carol’s (Dan’s) lab to try to inspect their outcomes. This second problem
does not arise for the reason the authors of [2] themselves state:
“If the four measurements would be identified with four space-time points
in which counts are registered, then the correlations between these counts will
be reference-frame independent and there would be no problem.” The “main
criticism” made in [2] of the argument in section 4 of [1] leaves that argument
untouched, and, on careful examination, the “multiple problems” alleged in [2]
turn out not to be problems at all.
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